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Comments
RECOMMENDED: AN OBJECTIVE STANDARD OF CARE
FOR MINORS IN NEBRASKA
I. INTRODUCTION
Tort law is not static. Existing as it does to provide a means
of recompense for those injured by "conduct which is socially un-
reasonable,"1 it follows that as society changes so too may social
development recharacterize people and their conduct so that what
was once realistic is now undesirable. This comment will be con-
cerned with the changes that are occurring in the standard of care
which is required of minors2 participating in certain adult activi-
ties. In all of the cases adjudicated by the Nebraska Supreme
Court in which a minor has been charged with negligence, con-
tributory rather than primary negligence has been alleged against
him.3  With perhaps one exception,4 the court has applied a sub-
jective standard of care to the minor accused of contributory negli-
1 W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF T=E LAW OF TORTS § 1, at 6 (3d ed. 1964).
2 'Minor" for the purposes of this article means any person under 21
years of age. An interesting article, which concludes that 21 became
fixed as the age of transfer from infancy to adulthood in the common
law because that was the age at which the son became eligible for
judicial combat and knight service, is James, The Age of Majority, 4
Am. J. LEGAL HIsT. 22, 30 (1960).
3 A minor may be charged with primary negligence when he is sued as
a defendant. When the minor is a plaintiff in a negligence suit the
defense of contributory negligence may be raised against him. A few
courts hold that the plaintiff must plead and prove his freedom from
contributory negligence. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS,
§ 64, at 426 (3d ed. 1964).
4 Johnston v. New Omaha Thomson-Houston Elec. Light Co., 78 Neb. 24,
110 N.W. 711 (1907), aff'd on rehearing, 78 Neb. 27, 113 N.W. 526 (1907),
aff'd on rehearing, 86 Neb. 165, 125 N.W. 153 (1910). The Johnston
case involved an unusual situation where the plaintiff's son, a boy age
12, persisted in attempting to touch the defendant's electric wires ex-
tending from the edge of a viaduct in spite of repeated warnings from
his friends. In its second opinion on the case, the Nebraska Supreme
Court said that irrespective of the defendant's negligence, the plaintiff
could not recover because his son had been guilty of contributory neg-
ligence as a matter of law. 78 Neb. at 32, 113 N.W. at 527-28. The
court did not mention applying a "subjective" standard of care to the
boy. The Johnston case has since apparently been limited to its facts
by the Nebraska Supreme Court. See Bear v. Auguy, 164 Neb. 756,
769, 83 N.W.2d 559, 567-68 (1957); Armer v. Omaha & C.B. St. Ry., 151
Neb. 431, 438-39, 37 N.W.2d 607, 611 (1949); Rule v. Claar Transfer &
Storage Co., 102 Neb. 4, 7, 165 N.W. 883, 884 (1917).
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gence.5 It is submitted that it is proper for the court to apply a
subjective standard of care in cases where the minor is charged
with contributory negligence; however, it ought to apply an ob-
jective or "reasonable man" standard of care when the minor is
alleged to have committed acts constituting primary negligence
and is found to have engaged in an adult activity potentially dan-
gerous to the public.
II. APPLICATION OF THE OBJECTIVE STANDARD TO
MINORS
A. SUBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE STANDARDS OF CARE
With but minor variation the rule in most jurisdictions as to
the standard of care required of minors to defeat an allegation
of negligence-be the negligence primary or contributory-is "that
of a reasonable person of like age, intelligence, and experience
under like circumstances."6  Often called the "subjective" stand-
ard of care, it allows the trier of fact (usually a jury) to take into
account the immaturity of the minor accused of negligence in terms
of his particular mental capacity and his individual lack of knowl-
edge and experience.7 After making allowance for any unripened
capacity and any gaps in experience and knowledge, the trier of
fact-theoretically at least-then compares the minor's behavior at
the time of the accident with how the prudent child of like capacity,
experience and knowledge would have acted in the same situation.
This is different from the "objective" standard of care which
adults must meet in order to escape being found either primarily
or contributorily negligent. An adult has to act as a reasonable
man of ordinary or average prudence would in the same or similar
circumstances.8 The reasonable man standard implies that a grown-
up serves as bench mark for the objective standard of care. Ex-
ceptions are seldom made in negligence cases for the adult whose
5 Vacanti v. Montes, 180 Neb. 232, 237, 142 N.W.2d 318, 322 (1966); Bear
v. Auguy, 164 Neb. 756, 768, 83 N.W.2d 559, 567 (1957); Armer v. Omaha
& C.B. St. Ry. Co., 151 Neb. 431, 438, 37 N.W.2d 607, 611 (1949); Kauff-
man v. Fundaburg, 123 Neb. 340, 344, 242 N.W. 658, 660 (1932); Chicago,
B. & Q. R.R. v. Grablin, 38 Neb. 90, 100, 56 N.W. 796, 798 (1893); Huff
v. Ames, 16 Neb. 139, 141-42, 19 N.W. 623, 624 (1884).
6 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 283A, 464(2) (1965).
7 Shulman, The Standard of Care Required of Children, 37 YALE L.J. 618,
625 (1928); 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 8.13, at 658
(1956).
8 Reed v. Metropolitan Util. Dist., 173 Neb. 854, 857-58, 115 N.W.2d 453,
456 (1962); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 32, at 153-54
(3d ed. 1964).
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mental capacity falls below that of the "reasonable man,"9 and the
adult with a physical disability of which he is aware must proceed
in public as would a reasonable man with such a handicap.10
B. MODIFICATION OF THE SuBJEcTIVE STANDARD OF CARE
While the majority of courts apply a subjective standard of care
to minors charged with negligence regardless of the situation in
which the accident took place," a significant number have moved
to a "reasonable man" or objective standard of care for the minor
when he engages in certain "adult" activities. The objective stand-
ard of care has been imposed on minors driving automobiles, 2
motor scooters and motorcycles,13 power boats14 and airplanes. 5
A number of rationales have been used by these courts to ar-
rive at their holdings. Some have found that the legislature has
impliedly demanded an objective standard for minors driving ve-
hicles on public streets and highways by stipulating, via statute,
that all drivers must meet the same licensing requisites 6 or obey
the same safety rules.'7 Allen v. Ellis'8 is a good example of this
approach. In this case plaintiff's young son was walking across a
wide, well-lighted street at night when he was struck by the de-
fendant motorist. Although only sixteen years old, the defendant
9 RESTATEIENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283B (1965).
10 RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283C (1965).
11 W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 32, at 158-59 (3d ed.
1964).
12 Hill v. Transp. Co. v. Everett, 145 F.2d 746 (1st Cir. 1944); Wagner v.
Shanks, 194 A.2d 701 (Del. 1963); Dawson v. Hoffmann, 43 Ill. App. 2d
17, 192 N.E.2d 695 (1963); Betzold v. Erickson, 35 Ill. App. 2d 203, 182
N.E.2d 342 (1962); Allen v. Ellis, 191 Kan. 311, 380 P.2d 408 (1963);
Wilson v. Shumate, 296 S.W.2d 72 (Mo. 1956); Carano v. Cardina, 115
Ohio App. 30, 184 N.E.2d 430 (1961); Nielsen v. Brown, 232 Ore. 426,
374 P.2d 896 (1962).
'3 Harrelson v. Whitehead, 236 Ark. 325, 365 S.W.2d 868 (1963); Adams
v. Lopez, 75 N.M. 503, 407 P.2d 50 (1965); Powell v. Hartford Accident
& Indem. Co., 398 S.W.2d 727 (Tenn. 1966).
14 Dellwo v. Pearson, 259 Minn. 452, 458, 107 N.W.2d 859, 863 (1961).
15 Id.
16 Wagner v. Shanks, 194 A.2d 701, 708 (Del. 1963); Betzold v. Erickson,
35 Ill. App. 2d 203, 209, 182 N.E.2d 342, 345 (1962); Allen v. Ellis, 191
Kan. 311, 317, 380 P.2d 408, 412-13 (1963); Nielsen v. Brown, 232 Ore.
426, 451-52, 374 P.2d 896, 908 (1962).
17 Harrelson v. Whitehead, 236 Ark. 325, 327, 365 S.W.2d 868, 869 (1963);
Wilson v. Shumate, 296 S.W.2d 72, 77 (Mo. 1956); Daniels v. Evans, 224
A.2d 63, 65-66, (N.H. 1966).
18 191 Kan. 311, 380 P.2d 408 (1963).
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reversing a judgment for the defendant, the Kansas Supreme Court
held that the state licensing law demanded that he observe an
objective standard when at the wheel:
There is nothing in the Uniform Operators' and Chauffer's License
Act (G.S. 1961 Supp., Ch. 8, Art. 2) that makes any exception to
the standard of care and caution required as between minors and
adults. The act was passed for the protection of the general public
and users of the streets and highways and not for the protection
of immature, inexperienced and negligent drivers. 19
Other courts, in concluding that an objective standard is re-
quired of the minor when he participates in activities adult in na-
ture, have anchored their holdings to a common law "rule of rea-
son" rather than to any particular statute.20 The leading case adopt-
ing the "rule of reason" theory is Dellwo v. Pearson.21 The plain-
tiffs, husband and wife, were fishing on a lake and had lines trailing
behind their boat. The defendant, a boy age twelve, was operating a
boat with an outboard motor. He crossed behind the plaintiffs' boat
and apparently caught the line being held by the plaintiff wife.
Her line was suddenly pulled out to the end and her rod was forced
downward, causing the reel to hit the side of the boat. The reel
came apart and a piece of it penetrated the lens of the plaintiff
wife's glasses and injured her eye. The plaintiffs sued in negli-
gence and the case went to the jury with an instruction that the
defendant was required to exercise only that degree of care which
a child of like age, capacity and experience would use under the
same or similar circumstances. Reversing a lower court judgment
held a state driver's license. Over the plaintiff's objection, the
trial court had instructed the jury that mere possession by the de-
fendant of a valid and unrestricted driver's license did not in and
of itself require him to exercise a grown-up standard of care. In
19 Id. at 317, 380 P.2d at 412-13.
20 Dawson v. Hoffman, 43 Ill. App. 2d 17, 20, 192 N.E.2d 695, 696 (1963);
Dellwo v. Pearson, 259 Minn. 452, 458, 107 N.W.2d 859, 863 (1961);
Adams v. Lopez, 75 N.M. 503, 507, 407 P.2d 50, 52 (1965); Carano v.
Cardina, 115 Ohio App. 30, 33, 184 N.E.2d 430, 432 (1961); Powell v.
Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 398 S.W.2d 727, 732 (Tenn. 1966).
The recent New Hampshire case of Daniels v. Evans, 224 A.2d 63
(N.H. 1966) seems to have been partially decided on a "rule of reason"
basis. Id. at 64-66. Although Daniels did not explicitly overrule Char-
bonneau v. MacRury, 84 N.H. 501, 153 A. 457 (1931), it appears to
necessarily have done so. Charbonneau was formerly the leading case
holding that minors need observe only a subjective standard of care
when driving automobiles. The rule of the Daniels case is that "a
minor operating a motor vehicle, whether an automobile or a motor-
cycle, must be judged by the same standard of care as an adult ... "
224 A.2d at 66.
21 259 Minn. 452, 107 N.W.2d 859 (1961).
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for the defendant, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that a minor
was obligated to observe an objective standard of care when oper-
ating an automobile, airplane or power boat.22 The court cited no
licensing or safety statutes, articulating instead the following
policy reasons for its decision:
To give legal sanction to the operation of automobiles by teen-
agers with less than ordinary care for the safety of others is im-
practical today, to say the least. We may take judicial notice of
the hazards of automobile traffic, the frequency of accidents, the
often catastrophic results of accidents, and the fact that immature
individuals are no less prone to accidents than adults. While mi-
nors are entitled to be judged by standards commensurate with
age, experience, and wisdom when engaged in activities appropri-
ate to their age, experience, and wisdom, it would be unfair to the
public to permit a minor in the operation of a motor vehicle to
observe any other standards of care and conduct than those ex-
pected of all others. A person observing children ... engaged in
* . . childhood activities may anticipate conduct that does not reach
an adult standard of care or prudence. However, one cannot know
whether the operator of an approaching automobile, airplane, or
powerboat is a minor or an adult, and usually cannot protect him-
self against youthful imprudence even if warned. 23
The Restatement of Torts, 2d appears to be in accord with the
Dellwo case and others24 in suggesting that, essentially on a com-
mon law basis, minors should be held to a "reasonable man" cri-
terion of behavior when taking part in an adult pursuit.
25
C. PoLIcY REASONS FOR HoLDING MINORS TO AN OBJECTIVE STANDARD
OF CARE
The arguments in favor of extending an objective standard of
care to minors participating in certain adult activities are impres-
sive and are as valid in Nebraska as in other states. Today large
numbers of minor participate in activities of an adult nature. Con-
sidering motor vehicle operation as an example, it is estimated by
the Nebraska Department of Motor Vehicles that out of about
917,000 total licensed drivers in Nebraska in 1966, 115,000 to 118,000
were in the age group from sixteen to twenty-one. In addition,
approximately 4,000 restricted licenses were held by drivers from
ages fourteen to sixteen,26 and there were about 32,000 learner's
22 Id. at 458, 107 N.W.2d at 863.
23 Id.
24 Dawson v. Hoffmann, 43 Ill. App. 2d 17, 192 N.E.2d 695 (1963); Adams
v. Lopez, 75 N.M. 503, 407 P.2d 50 (1965); Carano v. Cardina, 115 Ohio
App. 30, 184 N.E.2d 430 (1961); Powell v. Hartford Accident & Indem.
Co., 398 S.W.2d 727 (Tenn. 1966).
25 REsTATEMEN (SEcoND) OF ToRTs § 283A, comment c (1965).
26 NEB. REV. STAT. § 60-407 (3) (Supp. 1965), provides that a minor over
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permits issued for drivers of age fourteen and over.27
Minors are usually involved in a considerable number of the
accidents which arise out of the adult activity in which they en-
gage. Again using motor vehicle operation as an example, in Ne-
braska during 1965 out of a total of 48,728 drivers involved in motor
vehicle accidents, 9,461 were drivers age nineteen or under and
17,786 were drivers age twenty-four or under. Of the 457 drivers
involved in fatal accidents in the state in 1965, 68 were age nine-
teen or under and 143 were age twenty-four or under.28
As was pointed out by the Minnesota court in the Dellwo case,
the rest of the public often does not know that a minor is the one
engaging in the adult activity and-even if the minor is recognized
as such-time is not always available for those meeting him to
take extra precautions against any mistakes he may make.29
The insurance factor cannot be overlooked as a policy reason
for demanding an objective standard of care from minors participat-
ing in various adult pursuits. Most motor vehicles operated on the
streets and highways by minors are covered by liability policies,
ordinarily carried by their parents.30  Hence the financial conse-
quences of minors' negligent driving does not commonly fall upon
them as individuals-rather it is being borne by and is distributed
among their insured parents.31
the age of 14 who lives outside metropolitan, primary and first-class
cities may obtain a limited permit to drive to and from school if he
lives at least 1% miles from school. However, the minor must pass a
driver's examination to obtain this permit.
27 NEB. REV. STAT. § 60-407(3) and (5) (Supp. 1965), authorizes certain
minors who are over 14 and all minors who have reached age 15 to
obtain a learner's permit which allows them to drive on the highway
if accompanied by a licensed driver 21 years of age or older.
28 ACCIDENT RECORD BUREAU, NEB. DEP'T. OF RDS., STANDARD SUMMARY OF
NEBRASKA MOTOR VEHICLE TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS FOR JANUARY-DECEMBER
(1965). These figures exclude the drivers of vehicles involved in ac-
cidents while in proper parking positions.
29 Adams v. Lopez, 75 N.M. 503, 507, 407 P.2d 50, 52 (1965).
30 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 13.4 at 769 (1956); Notes,
Torts: Application of Adult Standard of Care to Minor Motor Vehicle
Operators, 1962 DUKE L.J. 138, 141-42; 24 Omo ST. L.J. 401, 404 (1963).
The Nebraska Motor Vehicle Safety Act provides that after a driver has
had an accident in which any person is killed or injured or in which
damage is in apparent excess of $100, the driver or the owner, in order
to prevent suspension of their driver's license, must give security of not
less than $500 to satisfy any judgment which may arise against them
from the accident, or else show that the motor vehicle involved was
insured for certain amounts. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 60-505, 60-507, 60-508
(Supp. 1965) and 60-509 (Reissue 1960).
31 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 13.4 at 770 (1956).
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Imposing an objective standard of care on minor drivers might
increase the cost of their parents' insurance because jurors would
more frequently find that the minor was negligent. But it seems
more reasonable for the insured parents to bear this extra burden
as a class rather than to leave the individual plaintiff having to
pay the entire cost of his injury by permitting the minor to wear
the protective mantle of a child's standard of care.32 Also to be
considered is that the minor usually has the sanction of his parents
when operating a motor vehicle.
D. SHOULD THE NEBRAsKA SUPRE1Im COURT ADOPT THE "STATUTORY"
OR THE "CoMMON LAW" APPROACH?
If the Nebraska Supreme Court does see fit to apply an ob-
jective standard of care to minors when they participate in certain
adult activities, the question then becomes: which would be the
best approach for the court to take-statutory or common law?
Should it take the statutory approach, the court would have lit-
tle difficulty finding solid ground to stand on in the various Ne-
braska licensing and safety statutes. Considering statutes pertain-
ing to motor vehicles as an example, the court might conclude from a
reading of these statutes that the legislature has impliedly de-
manded application of an objective standard to the minor when he
is driving a motor vehicle on the public roads. Nebraska's main
licensing statute provides that "no person" may operate a motor
vehicle on streets, alleys or public highways in the state without
first obtaining a license.33 Other statutes stipulate that no "appli-
32 NEB. REV. STAT. § 60-509.01 (Supp. 1965) provides that every liability
policy issued on a motor vehicle "registered or principally garaged" in
Nebraska must contain a provision insuring the owner and user thereof
against legally recoverable damages caused them by owners or oper-
ators of uninsured or hit-and-run motor vehicles. This "uninsured and
hit-and-run" coverage goes into every liability policy unless the in-
sured rejects it. In view of the statute's wording, the chances of a
plaintiff who has been injured by an uninsured minor recovering from
his own insurance company would be much improved if the minor
were held to an objective standard of care. The statute stipulates that
the policy must insure the plaintiff (within certain dollar limits) for
damages he is "legally entitled" to recover from the defendant. By
holding the minor defendant to an objective standard of care the plain-
tiff could more easily show that the defendant is legally liable.
33 NEB. REV. STAT. § 60-403 (Supp. 1965). There are certain exceptions to
the licensing requirement, for example where the party possesses a
learner's permit. It may be noted that the definition of "motor ve-
hicle" in NEB. REv. STAT. § 60-401 (Supp. 1965) encompasses "all ve-
hicles propelled by any power other than muscular power, except self-
propelled invalid chairs, farm tractors used occasionally outside of
general farm usage, road rollers, and any vehicle which run only on
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cant" may secure a driver's license until he passes certain physical
and driving skill tests.34 Nebraska safety statutes are so written
to make "any person" who drives a motor vehicle in indifferent,
wanton or willful disregard for the safety of persons or property
guilty or reckless, or willful reckless, driving.3 5
All of these statutes refer to "person" or "applicant" in gen-
eral and make no distinctions or allowances for age. 36 On the basis
of the licensing statutes it could be maintained that after a minor is
old enough to qualify for a driver's license he must, in addition
to possessing adequate physical capabilities, meet an adult standard
of operating skill in order to get the license. If, even without se-
curing a license, the minor proceeds to operate a motor vehicle on
the public streets and highways, he ostensibly must observe the
common standard of care implicit in the safety and speed limit stat-
utes.3
7
Nevertheless the Nebraska Supreme Court would do well to
base its decision on a common law "rule of reason" theory if it
rails or tracks .... ." This definition would include motorcycles, motor
scooters and motor bicycles. NEB. REV. STAT. § 60-403 (Supp. 1965)
requires all persons operating such motor vehicles to have a license
for that purpose. Hence it would seem that all operators of two-
wheeled motor-powered vehicles must have driver's licenses to oper-
ate them on streets and highways in Nebraska. Undoubtedly most of
the drivers of these two-wheeled vehicles are minors. Whether or
not these minors all hold driver's licenses is another question.
34 NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 60-407, 60-408 (Supp. 1965).
35 NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 39-7,107, 39-7,107.02 (Reissue 1960). See also §§
39-7,108 and 39-723 (Supp. 1965) (speed).
36 See NEB. REv. STAT. § 81-815.10(1) (Supp. 1965) which provides that
"no person shall operate any motorboat or vessel, or manipulate any
water skis, surfboard, or similar device in a reckless or negligent man-
ner so as to endanger the life, limb, or property of any person." NEB.
REv. STAT. § 3-129 (Reissue 1962) states in part that "it shall be un-
lawful for any person to engage in aeronautics as an airman in this
state unless he has . . . an effective certificate of registration of an
appropriate airman's license, certificate or permit .... ." Excluded
from the requisites of § 3-129 are certain airmen traveling interstate,
airmen from other states if properly licensed in their home state, and
persons learning to fly if with an instructor.
37 The situation may arise where a minor accidentally sets a motor vehicle
into motion on a public road. For example, the young 4 year-old,
momentarily left alone in the car while his parent goes into a store,
may release the emergency brake and cause the car to roll out into
the street where it collides with another vehicle. Here, an objective
standard of care should not be required of the minor because he is not
really driving the car. Moreover the owner of the other vehicle would
in all likelihood sue the parent for his negligence in leaving the young
minor unattended in the car.
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decides to apply an objective standard of care to minors pursuing
adult activities which involve danger to the public. The most obvi-
ous limitation to the statutory approach is that it would restrict
the courts to imposing an objective standard on the minor only
when he participates in an adult activity governed by statute.
Certain types of adult activities in which minors engage are not
regulated by statute. Nonetheless such activities seem appropriate
for imposition of a "reasonable man" standard of care on the minor
who pursues them. Hunting with a gun, setting traps and shooting
arrows are three examples.2 8
The same policy reasons for applying an objective standard of
care to the minor when he is driving an automobile are present in
the situations represented by these examples. Often other mem-
bers of the public are unaware that it is a minor who is involved
in the activity, therefore, they cannot take additional measures to
avoid an accident. Also the minor may, while engaging in such an
activity, be covered under a comprehensive personal liability policy
carried by his parents. The personal liability provisions in many
homeowners' package policies, an increasingly popular type of in-
surance protection, appear broad enough to cover, for example,
damages from hunting accidents caused by an insured.
E. A PROBLEM IN APPLYING THE OBiJECTIVE STANDARD OF CARE TO
MINORS
One question left unanswered by courts which have applied
the objective standard of care to minors is: what are all of the
adult activities in which minors' participation should subject them
to a grown-up standard?
In all of the cases cited above in which an objective standard
was imposed on the minor, the minor was operating a motor-
powered vehicle or boat. One could argue that these courts intend
the driving of motor-powered transportation devices to be the only
area in which minors should be held to an adult standard, and
that when the courts use the term "adult activity" to characterize
the minor's pursuit, they use it only in this narrow sense. It is
indeed possible that the underlying rationale of these courts is that
when a minor operates a self-propelled vehicle, boat or airplane
he is obliged to follow a higher standard of care than the subjec-
tive standard to which he is ordinarily held-which higher stand-
ard is for him the objective standard-because he is operating a
machine which is potentially dangerous to others.
38 There are of course state statutes regulating the taking of fish and
game. See NEB. R.v. STAT. §§ 37-101 through 37-614 (Reissue 1960 and
Supp. 1965).
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But regardless of the fact that in all of the precedent cases
cited in which the courts have held minors to an objective stand-
ard the minor was operating a motor-driven transportation device,
it is contended that the objective standard should not be reserved
for application only to those minors involved in such activities.
This would unnecessarily limit the rule. Examples of other situ-
ations where an objective standard might reasonably be applied to
the minor are, as previously mentioned, when he is hunting with a
gun, setting traps, or shooting arrows. Although the minor is not
operating a motor-driven machine in any of these instances, he is
still carrying on a pursuit which involves considerable danger to
others.
"Adult activity" may not seem a proper term for all of the
activities in which, if the minor engages, the courts have applied
or will apply to him a "reasonable man" standard of care. For
example, most motor scooters and motor bicycles are probably not
operated by adults. 39 But whatever the name given to the area in
which these activities are grouped, the area should purposely be
left broad so that courts may add activities to it as they determine
that minors participating therein must observe an objective stand-
ard of care.
Some may insist that it is against logic to say that a minor
should in any instance be held to an objective or "reasonable man"
standard of care for the simple reason that a minor is not an
adult and so cannot act like one. Without belaboring the obvious
counterargument that drawing a rigid dividing line between mi-
39 Three years after the Arkansas Supreme Court had decided, primarily
on the basis of the state's safety statutes pertaining to motor vehicles,
that a 15 year old motorcycle operator was required to observe an
objective standard of care, Harrelson v. Whitehead, 236 Ark. 325, 365
S.W.2d 868 (1963), it was urged upon the court that a 7 year old bi-
cyclist should be held to an objective standard of care because the
motor vehicle statutes also applied to persons riding bicycles. The
court (with one dissent) refused to accept this argument, first pointing
out that motor vehicle operators had to hold driver's licenses whereas
bicycle drivers did not. The court continued: "There can be no serious
comparison of a sixteen-year-old youth driving an automobile with a
seven-year-old child riding a bicycle-as much a plaything as a means
of transportation. The automobile poses all the threats to human life
that led to our decision in the Harrelson case, but the bicycle poses no
threat of serious injury to anyone except the child himself." Williams
v. Gilbert, 395 S.W.2d 333, 335 (Ark. 1965). The Nebraska Supreme
Court has recently held that a bicycle is a vehicle within the meaning
of the state's rules of the road statutes, and that a minor bicycle oper-
ator must observe these rules. Sacca v. Marshall, 180 Neb. 855, 146
N.W.2d 375 (1966). However, the decision did not impose a new
standard of care on a minor bicycle operator.
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nority and majority at age twenty-one does not itself admit of ir-
refutable logic, it is well to look at what the courts which have
applied an objective standard to the minor are trying to accomplish.
In essence, these courts are making provision for an instruction to
the jury that a minor must observe a higher standard of care than
he normally does when he engages in certain activities danger-
ous to the rest of the public which the courts have for convenience
labeled "adult." The "reasonable man" standard of care has been
seized upon by these courts as an effective means of impressing on
the jury that when a minor participates in such activities he must
behave with much more care than he customarily does.
F. A SuBJXCTin STANARD IS PROPER FOR MINORS WHEN CONTRIBU-
TORY NELIGENCE40 Is ALLEGED
Where the minor is the plaintiff and contributory negligence is
raised as a defense against him, policy reasons which support ap-
plying an objective standard of care vis-a-vis primary negligence
no longer obtain, albeit the minor has engaged in the identical ac-
tivity in both instances. "Contributory negligence is conduct on
the part of the plaintiff which falls below the standard to which he
should conform for his own protection, and which is a legally con-
tributing cause co-operating with the negligence of the defendant
in bringing about the plaintiff's harm."' 41 It involves conduct by
the plaintiff harmful to himself rather than to others 42 and becomes
necessary as a defense only after the defendant has been shown
to have been negligent in causing injury to the plaintiff.
Requiring the minor accused of contributory negligence to meet
a "reasonable man" standard of care would diminish his prospects
of recovering from a negligent defendant. It would hamper the
desirable social policy of distributing the plaintiff's loss among the
numerous members of the class of insureds to which the defendant
would in most instances belong. At the same time it would in-
crease the possibility of the plaintiff having to shoulder the entire
cost of his injury.43
40 Admittedly, some courts have applied an objective standard of care
to minors charged with contributory negligence. See Harrelson v.
Whitehead, 236 Ark. 325, 365 S.W.2d 868 (1963); Wilson v. Shumate,
296 S.W.2d 72 (Mo. 1956); Daniels v. Evans, 224 A.2d 63 (N.H. 1966);
Adams v. Lopez, 75 N.M. 503, 407 P.2d 50 (1965); Powell v. Hartford
Accident & Indem. Co., 398 S.W.2d 727 (Tenn. 1966).
4 RESTATmvmNT (SECOND) or ToRTs § 463 (1965).
42 James, Contributory Negligence, 62 YALE L.J. 691, 723 (1953).
43 James, Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insur-
ance, 57 YALE L.J. 549, 550 (1948); Notes, Torts: Application of Adult
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Another reason for imposing an objective standard of care on
the minor charged with primary negligence-that the rest of the
public is not able to look out for the immaturity of the minor-also
loses validity when contributory negligence is alleged. If the de-
fendant was negligent towards the minor plaintiff-which must
be the situation before the defense of contributory negligence may
be activated-he should not be able to complain that he might not
have proceeded negligently had the plaintiff been observing a
grown-up standard of care.
In most jurisdictions, if a negligent defendant can show negli-
gence by the plaintiff which contributed to the plaintiff's injury, the
latter is entirely cut off from recovery unless the defendant had
the last clear chance to avoid the accident. 44 The harshness of
this rule has been mitigated somewhat in Nebraska by a compara-
tive negligence statute which provides that if the plaintiff's contrib-
utory negligence is slight and the defendant's primary negligence is
gross in comparison, the plaintiff's negligence will only go to lessen
his damages and not bar them completely.45 Contributory negli-
gence as a defense has also met with increasing disfavor by the
courts.46 It should not be given sustenance by holding that a
minor must observe a "reasonable man" standard of care to de-
feat it. 47
III. CONCLUSION
The Nebraska Supreme Court should require application of an
objective or "reasonable man" standard of care to minors charged
with primary negligence in suits arising out of their participation
in those adult activities which are potentially dangerous to the rest
of the public. Where minors engage in such activities in any ap-
Standard of Care to Minor Motor Vehicle Operators, 1962 DuKE L.J.
138, 142; 24 OHIO ST. L.J. 401, 404 (1963).
44 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 467 (1965).
45 NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1151 (Reissue 1964).
46 W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 64, at 428 (3d ed. 1964).
47 The situation may arise where both the defendant and the plaintiff in
the negligence suit are minors of about the same age, and both were
involved in the same kind of activity, for example, driving a car. It
would seem incongrous to the jury, some might contend, to have thejudge charge them that the minor defendant must be found to have
obeyed an adult standard of care to defeat the allegation of primary
negligence against him, while the minor plaintiff need be found to
have followed only a subjective standard of care to defeat the allega-
tion of contributory negligence against him-when both minors were
driving cars at the time of the accident. The judge could help remove
this apparent incongruity by giving to the jury a short instruction on
the theory of contributory negligence.
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preciable number they are usually involved in many of the acci-
dents which arise therefrom. Often the rest of the public receives
no advance notice that it is a minor who is pursuing the adult
activity arid they have no opportunity to watch out for any display
of immaturity on his part. Although application of an objective
standard of care to minor defendants would probably increase the
incidence of recovery by plaintiffs, the resulting financial burden
would be distributed mostly over a large class of insured parents.
Such seems a better consequence than the individual plaintiff bear-
ing the entire cost of his injury because the jury was instructed
that the minor only had to meet a subjective standard of care.
However, the subjective standard of care should be retained
for the minor charged with contributory negligence. Imposing a
"reasonable man" standard of care on the minor plaintiff against
whom contributory negligence is alleged would lessen the liklihood
of the cost of the plaintiff's injury being distributed among the
large class of insureds to which the defendant in most instances
would belong and, at the same time, increase the probability of
the plaintiff assuming the entire cost of his injury himself.
William B. Fenton, '68
